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No. 15-14889

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
EDWARD LEWIS TOBINICK, MD, A Medical Corporation,
d/b/a INSTITUTE OF NEUROLOGICAL RECOVERY; INR PLLC,
d/b/a INSTITUTE OF NEUROLOGICAL RECOVERY;
EDWARD TOBINICK, M.D.,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
v.
STEVEN NOVELLA, M.D.,
Defendant/Appellee.
_____________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 9:14-cv-80781-RLR
(Hon. Robin L. Rosenberg)
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PROFESSORS

Counsel for Amici Curiae

MARK P. MCKENNA
NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
3120 Eck Hall of Law
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
(574) 631-9258
markmckenna@nd.edu

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 29(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Amici
Intellectual Property Law Professors request leave to file the accompanying amicus
curiae brief in support of Appellee Novella. Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 29,
Amici attempted to obtain the consent of all parties before moving for permission
to file the proposed brief. Appellees have consented to the filing of this brief, but
Appellants have refused consent.
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amici are intellectual property law professors who teach and have written
extensively about the Lanham Act and related intellectual property subjects. Our
sole interest is in the orderly development of Lanham Act law and First
Amendment law in a way that serves the public interest.
THE AMICUS’S BRIEF WILL ASSIST THE COURT AND IS RELEVANT
TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Amici Intellectual Property Law Professors offer this brief to explain how
this Court can avoid an inappropriate application of the Lanham Act to
noncommercial speech, while also reserving an appropriate scope for the false
advertising provisions of the Lanham Act in true commercial speech cases. Amici
are concerned both about overextension of the Lanham Act to interfere with any
speech that could be construed as fundraising and about overstatements of the
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constraints that the First Amendment should put on ordinary Lanham Act false
advertising cases.
Given the recurring question of the intersection of the Lanham Act and the
First Amendment, resolution of this case is likely to have significant legal impact,
and Amici hope to provide useful background for the Court as it considers the case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Amici request that this Court accept the
attached brief as filed.
Dated: November 30, 2015

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
By: __/Mark P. McKenna/____________
MARK P. MCKENNA
NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL
3120 Eck Hall of Law
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
(574) 631-9258
markmckenna@nd.edu
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I filed the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE.
I further certify that I served the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE on counsel for the parties, by
sending a copy thereof by UPS to the address of each counsel, as listed below:
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the undersigned states
that none of the Amici is a corporation or has a parent corporation.

Dated: May 27, 2016
By:

/Mark P. McKenna/
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 29(c)(5)
Counsel for the parties did not author this brief in whole or in part. The
parties have not contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the
brief. No person other than Amici Curiae or their counsel contributed money to
fund preparation or submission of this brief.
Dated: May 27, 2016
By:

/Mark P. McKenna/
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici are law professors who teach and have written extensively about
advertising law and related subjects. Our sole interest in this case is in the orderly
development of advertising law in a way that serves the public interest. Amici take
no position on the merits of the factual claims, or on the legal issues except insofar
as they relate to the Lanham Act false advertising claims.*
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CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
Counsel for Appellees consented to the filing of this brief. Counsel for
Appellants declined to consent. Amici’s motion for leave to file this Amicus Brief
is enclosed herewith.
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I.

Summary of Argument
The District Court correctly determined that the challenged speech of Dr.

Steven Novella was not commercial speech for purposes of applying the Lanham
Act.

Appellant’s argument to the contrary conflates “seeking profit” with

“commercial speech.”
II.

Argument
There are difficult cases about the boundary between commercial and

noncommercial speech. This is not one of them. Commercial speech, at its core,
“does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). Here, “the
‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction ...
and other varieties of speech,” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455456 (1978), on which the Supreme Court’s doctrine “heavily” rests, Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637
(1985), is enough to decide this case.
Appellant seeks to have Appellees’ speech characterized as commercial
because Appellees stood to benefit from membership fees by people who agreed
with Appellees’ outlook on scientific issues and/or wanted to support similar
content. That’s the definition of advocacy, not of commercial speech—speech
3

designed to support the sale of something other than speech itself. Appellant
makes a category error, conflating for-profit informative speech with commercial
speech, a far more limited subset thereof. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at iv, vii, 5051.
The fact that a diagram is needed to track the alleged connection between
Appellees’ speech and profit suggests the problem with Appellant’s theory. See,
e.g., Appellant’s Br. at v. Such an attenuated connection between the content of
the speech and the ultimate financial benefit to the speaker is a hallmark of
noncommercial speech, not commercial speech. Cf. Gordon & Breach Science
Publishers, S.A. v. American Institute of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1541
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the separate interests of an officer of a nonprofit
association didn’t have a sufficient connection to the nonprofit’s publications to
“convert [the nonprofit’s] fully protected commentary into less-protected
commercial speech”).
The New York Times seeks a return on its capital, and may even hope to
lure advertisers targeting particular demographics, for example by running a
section on wealthy New Yorkers, but neither of those facts makes its speech
“commercial” speech, a specific category of content under the First Amendment.
Appellant’s argument can’t distinguish Appellees’ activities from those of
traditional press entities such as the New York Times or investigatory non-profit
4

ProPublica. 1 See Appellant’s Br. at 5 (arguing that Appellees’ speech was
commercial because website ran ads for third parties); id. at 46-47 (arguing that
soliciting donations to support investigations was commercial speech).
The district court found the dispositive facts: The articles here proposed no
commercial transaction, and weren’t related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience. They clearly intended to raise public awareness about
issues pertaining to Appellant’s treatments. The only products or services the
articles referenced were Appellant’s treatments. To the extent the second article
referred to Appellee Novella’s practice, “it is in direct response to the instant
litigation as opposed to an independent plug for that practice.”

Tobinick v.

Novella, --- F. Supp. 3d ---- , 2015 WL 6777458, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
Matters might well be different if, in the course of soliciting patients for
his own practice, Appellee Novella had made factual statements about Appellant’s
treatments. It is notable, however, that Appellant carefully avoided any such
allegation.

See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at vii (failing to specify what, exactly,

Appellee did to further his “goals of making money and self-promotion”).
Appellant argues only that the challenged speech served to draw dollars to

1

Award-winning journalism organization ProPublica investigates specific entities
and industries. ProPublica may inflict economic harm when its reporting reveals
disturbing facts. Furthermore, ProPublica actively solicits donations to continue
this work. See https://www.propublica.org/investigations/. Appellant accuses
Appellees of doing exactly the same thing, and calls that commercial speech.
5

Appellee SGU, not to medical services provided by Appellee Novella. Appellant’s
Br. at 2-5. This concession simplifies matters considerably. According to the facts
as produced to the district court on summary judgment, the only path to profit for
Appellees from the challenged articles lay in convincing audiences that their
speech was worth supporting—not that Appellee Novella’s medical practice was.
That profit mechanism is insufficient to trigger the Lanham Act. Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (rejecting the argument that “motion
pictures” fall outside “the First Amendment’s aegis because their production,
distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit”);
Dryer v. National Football League, 814 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding
that “the NFL’s economic motivations alone cannot convert these productions into
commercial speech” despite the fact that films enhanced the NFL’s brand and
increased the appeal of NFL Football generally).
The district court’s holding that Novella could be a noncommercial speaker
in some contexts, while also being a practicing doctor, made sense of the
commercial/noncommercial distinction.

When Dr. Oz counsels an individual

patient, his speech is professional speech, and it may result in malpractice liability
if it falls below the standard of care without implicating the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis
of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 950. When Dr. Oz touts
6

remedies that he offers to sell, his speech about those remedies is commercial
speech. When Dr. Oz sells books touting amazing cures, he is not ordinarily
engaging in commercial speech.2
Appellant’s attempt to muddy the distinction between constitutionally
noncommercial, for-profit speech and commercial speech shows only the wisdom
of that distinction, which allows consumer protection law to coexist with robust
freedom for political speech. Appellant relies on World Wrestling Federation
Entertainment, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), in which
defendants ran a campaign with “the stated goal . . . to ‘educate’ its members” and
the WWF’s sponsors and advertisers that the WWF was a dangerous entity. Id. at
521. Bozell found that the attacks on the WWF were “featured prominently in a
fundraising video” for the organization, which bragged that the campaign “hurt the
WWF[] and had increased the [Parents Television Council’s] fundraising revenue
and given it increased notoriety.” Id. at 525. Bozell rejected a motion to dismiss in
part because the court concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could find the

2

Except insofar as his representations about his books are commercial: if he
misrepresented the price of the books, false advertising law would be implicated.
Further, if Dr. Oz were using excerpts from his books to tout particular remedies
he was also selling, that would be a different matter. Cf. Gordon & Breach, 859 F.
Supp. at 1536 (holding that general publication of journal article was protected
speech; use of article reprints in specific advertising pitches to consumers of the
products evaluated in the article was commercial speech subject to the Lanham
Act). Fortunately, this Court need not decide such issues here, where Appellant
has challenged Appellees’ speech to the public.
7

defendant’s speech to be commercial because of the defendant’s goals of making
money and promoting itself.
Amici respectfully disagree with the result in Bozell. It is inconsistent with
the overall case law. For example, Bozell’s conclusion that self-promotion is
“commercial” is wildly overbroad. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On–Line
Commc’n Services, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (pointing out,
in copyright case, that counting self-promotion or notoreity as “commercial”
benefit renders the concept so broad as to be meaningless).
Numerous other cases reject Bozell’s reasoning. In Raymen v. United
Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2006), for example, the court found
that a nonprofit’s internet advertisement stating its political opinions was not
commercial speech, even though the nonprofit sought contributions from people
who clicked on the ad.

As the court pointed out, “only after using the

advertisement (by clicking on it) to access the webpages were viewers exposed to
the information about USA Next and the solicitation for financial contributions.”
Id. at 24.

The Raymen court distinguished this from direct promotion of a

defendant’s own services and noted that “the advertisement here discusses public
policy issues that are currently the subject of public debate.”

Id. (citations

omitted). Similarly, cognizant of the risks of deterring speech on matters of public
interest, another court found that fundraising appeals by People for the Ethical
8

Treatment of Animals which contained allegedly false statements about an animal
testing lab were noncommercial speech. Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Rokke, 978
F. Supp. 662, 666 (E.D. Va. 1997); see also Wojnarowicz v. American Family
Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141–42 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reaching result inconsistent
with Bozell for advocacy speech used in fundraising).

The D.C. Circuit has

specifically held that the kind of general “ideological” competition involved in this
case is not commercial. See Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 541 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (blog post about book was noncommercial political speech, though
Esquire stood to profit from gaining readers).
In general, critical analyses of a plaintiff’s offerings are not “commercial
speech” simply because the defendant is also a commercial entity. As the D.C.
Circuit explained:
Of course, writers write and publishers publish political tracts for
commercial purposes, and it is possible that the kinds of commercial
methods made illegal by the Lanham Act could be applied to such tracts.
The actions alleged, however, do not involve such methods. The mere fact
that the parties may compete in the marketplace of ideas is not sufficient to
invoke the Lanham Act. To the contrary, it reinforces Esquire’s position
that its blog post was political speech ….
Farah, 736 F.3d at 541; see also Neurotron, Inc. v. American Ass’n of
Electrodiagnostic, 189 F. Supp. 2d 271, 276-77 (D. Md. 2001) (article in
professional medical journal about medical devices wasn’t commercial speech);
Rotbart v. J.R. O’Dwyer Co., Inc., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (critical
9

comments about plaintiff in defendant’s newsletter were not actionable under §
43(a) because they did not promote defendant’s newsletter at the expense of
plaintiff’s competing newsletter); National Artists Management Co., Inc. v.
Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (interpreting the Lanham Act
to avoid application to “speech that relates to both goods and services, as well as
political issues—for example, misrepresentations made by interested groups which
may arguably disparage a company and its products because of the company’s
failure to divest its South African holdings, or disparaging statements regarding a
corporation’s policy toward product design, included in a law review article
addressing the law of product liability”); see also Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc. v. City
of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]here nonprofits
engage in activities where pure speech and commercial speech are inextricably
intertwined the entirety must be classified as fully protected noncommercial
speech.”).
Bozell’s lack of fit with the case law is unsurprising, because the reasoning
in Bozell is misguided. Fundraising isn’t in itself commercial speech. When
ProPublica touts its award-winning investigations and asks for public support, that
does not convert those investigations into commercial speech so that its targets can

10

now sue it under the Lanham Act’s strict liability regime rather than under the
more speech-protective defamation regime.3
The rule for which Appellant argues is a dangerous one with the potential
to convert almost every political dispute into a false advertising case. Pro-choice
organizations accuse pro-life organizations of deceptive conduct and seek to
fundraise as part of their advocacy missions;4 pro-life organizations do the same
thing.5 Politicians make disputed factual claims about other politicians’ business
activities, seeking to energize their supporters with these claims, to gain publicity
with them, and to solicit more contributions as a result.6 None of these disputes

3

Some statements by nonprofits might be commercial speech: In a solicitation of a
donation in return for a commemorative mug, the description of the mug might
well qualify as commercial speech, because of the tangible product provided to the
donor in return for the donation. Similarly, statements promising that specific
services would be provided to third parties in return for a donor’s money could
trigger the concerns underlying the commercial speech doctrine. But neither
situation would make the nonprofit’s other communicative activities commercial
speech, and each is easily distinguishable from the situation here.
4
See, e.g., Laura Bassett, Planned Parenthood Sees Spike In Donations As Attacks
Escalate, Huffington Post, July 30, 2015, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/planned-parenthooddonations_us_55ba2e3fe4b095423d0df22e.
5
See, e.g., National Right to Life, The Truth About Planned Parenthood,
http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/plannedparenthood/ (visited Apr. 20, 2016)
(soliciting donations on page attacking Planned Parenthood).
6
See, e.g., Alexander Mallin, President Obama Mocks Trump’s Business Ventures,
ABCNews.Go.Com, Mar. 11, 2016, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-mocks-trumps-business-ventureswine/story?id=37591368.
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should be adjudicated according to the Lanham Act’s strict liability standard.
Under Appellant’s logic, all of them should be.
III.

Conclusion
Noncommercial speech, like that of Appellees, is not unregulated.

Appellant could, and did, challenge it under the rigorous standards set forth by
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), for defamation. His inability to
prevail under that standard does not entitle him to a lower one, and his arguments
for why the speech at issue is commercial would put all for-profit—and even much
nonprofit—speech at risk.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court on the
Lanham Act claim should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

/Mark P. McKenna/
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